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Amy Rowley is a very bright eight year old child who despite
her deafness performs well above the median in her class.1 Like
most deaf people, she has minimal residual hearing and is an excel-
lent lipreader.' Since beginning public school, she has received
many special services,$ and the administrators of her school dis-
trict have responded constructively to the challenge of providing
her with an education.4 Nevertheless, because Amy could discern
1. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
2. Rowiey, 483 F. Supp. at 530. The efficacy of lipreading is reduced if the speaker is
not in view, or if many people are speaking at once. However, Amy is a well-adjusted child
who has excellent interaction with her teachers. Although she usually responds accurately to
her teacher's instructions, if she happens to miss something, she notifies her teacher. Id. at
531.
3. Id. at 530. The school district's Committee on the Handicapped (made up of a psy-
chologist, an educator, a physician and the parent of a handicapped child) recommend that
Amy be provided with: a) an FM wireless hearing aid; b) the services of a tutor for the deaf
for an hour every day; and c) the services of a speech therapist for three hours every week.
These recommendations were incorporated into Amy's individualized education program
(IEP) and enabled her to participate in class with a slight advantage over the other stu-
dents. Id. at 530-31.
Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. §§
1401-61 (1982), a local educational agency or intermediate educational unit that receives
federal funds under section 1411(d) must provide every handicapped child with an IEP that
must be revised at least once a year. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5). See infra notes 90, 93 and 94,
and accompanying text.
4. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 530. A teletype machine was installed in the school princi-
pal's office to facilitate communication with Amy's parents who are also deaf. Additionally,
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only fifty-nine percent of the words spoken to her,5 her parents
insisted upon the services of a sign language interpreter.6 On sev-
eral occasions, school officials provided interpreters for Amy, but
she resisted the interpretation and instead relied on her teachers
for instruction.7 As a result, the school administrators refused to
provide her with the services of a sign language interpreter.8 Amy's
parents, still insisting upon the services of a sign language inter-
preter, demanded and obtained a hearing before an independent
examiner. 9 The examiner denied the parents' request for an inter-
preter,10 and on appeal, the New York Commission of Education
affirmed the denial." The Rowleys then filed a civil suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York." The federal district court noted that although Amy was
performing well academically, she was not performing as well as
she would be performing without her handicap because she could
not identify one hundred percent of the words spoken to her.'"
Thus, the court held that she was not receiving a "free appropriate
public education" 4 as defined by the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975 ("EAHCA").'5 The district court de-
many of Amy's teachers enrolled in sign language interpretation courses.
5. Id. at 532. This figure was derived from the result of auditory speech discrimination
tests performed on Amy. The district court noted that words spoken in a familiar surround-
ing by a familiar speaker are easier to identify than words spoken under test conditions. But
the court also noted that Amy is likely to hear less in a noisy classroom and when more than
one person is speaking at a time. With the use of "total communication," which includes
simultaneously mouthing words and signing them, however, the court determined that Amy
would be able to identify 100% of the words spoken to her. Id.
6. Id. at 531.
7. Id. at 530. To determine whether Amy would benefit from a sign language inter-
preter, an interpreter was placed with her in the classroom for two weeks. The interpreter
reported that Amy resisted interpretation and asked the teacher rather than the interpreter
to repeat words she had missed. Additionally, Amy's first grade teacher testified that when
Amy's tutor used sign language to tell her what the teacher was saying in class, Amy looked
to the teacher rather than the tutor. Finally, when Amy was subjected to a sign language
interpretation test, she asked the teacher, rather than the sign language interpreter, to re-
peat whatever she failed to understand. Rowley, 632 F.2d at 950 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
8. Rowley, 632 F.2d at 950.
9. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 531.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 528.
13. Id. at 535. The court noted that no child understands 100% of the words spoken in
class, but these failures are due to either lack of intellectual potential or to lack of interest
and energy. In contrast, "Amy's lack of understanding... is inherent in her handicap." Id.
14. Id.
15. The EAHCA defines "free appropriate public education" as:
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public
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fined an "appropriate education" as "an opportunity [for handi-
capped children] to achieve [their] full potential commensurate
with the opportunity provided to other children."" The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision, 7 but the United States Supreme Court in
Board of Education v. Rowley"8 reversed and held that a state sat-
isfies the EAHCA's requirement of "free appropriate public educa-
tion" by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support
services to make it possible for the handicapped child to benefit
educationally.19 The Court noted that a state is not required to
maximize the potential of each child commensurate with the op-
portunity provided to nonhandicapped children. 0
Although the EAHCA has made both handicapped children
and their parents more conscious of a handicapped child's right to
an education,"1 the Act provides only general substantive guide-
lines for the meaning of a "free appropriate public education. '"2 In
Rowley, the Supreme Court skimmed the broad outlines of the
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet
the standards of the state educational agency, (C) include an appropriate pre-
school, elementary, or secondary school in the state involved, and (D) are pro-
vided in conformity with the individualized education program required under
section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982).
16. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534. The district court borrowed this definition from Note,
Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1103, 1125-26 (1979). Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534.
The author of the Harvard Note in turn borrowed the definition from 45 C.F.R. §
84.33(b)(1) (1977) (current version at 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1) (1983)). Note, at 1126 n.143.
See infra text accompanying note 119.
17. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945 (1980).
18. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
19. Id. at 203.
20. Id. at 198; see infra notes 113-14.
21. Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213, 214 (1980).
22. Congress intentionally did not attempt to define the word "appropriate" in the
EAHCA. See supra note 15; Stafford, Education For Handicapped: A Senator's Perspec-
tive, 3 VT. L. REv. 71, 75 (1978). Some commentators have addressed the substantive issues
surrounding the definition of a "free appropriate education." See Haggerty & Sacks, Educa-
tion Of The Handicapped: Towards a Definition of An Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP.
L.Q. 961 (1977); Large, supra note 21; Miller & Miller, The Education for All Handicapped
Act: How Well Does it Accomplish its Goal of Promoting the Least Restrictive Environ-
ment for Education? 28 DE PAuL L. REv. 321 (1979); Miller & Miller, The Handicapped
Child's Civil Right as it Relates to the "Least Restrictive Environment" and Appropriate
Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978); Comment, The Least Restrictive Environment Sec-
tion of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975: A Legislative History and
an Analysis, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 717 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Least Restric-
tive Environment).
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EAHCA and interpreted its provisions consistently with pre-
EAHCA decisions. This Comment establishes that prior to Rowley
the courts recognized a handicapped child's constitutionally based
right to an education. A handicapped child's right to an education,
however, has never extended beyond simple access to a publicly
supported education. The study of these cases reveals that the Su-
preme Court has been quite consistent in interpreting the right to
a publicly supported education and has respected the states' tradi-
tional role in education. Finally, this Comment discusses the rea-
sons why education for the handicapped has always been a contro-
versial subject.
I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
A. The Judicially Recognized Right to an Education
Traditionally, both federal and state governments have been
concerned with the education of our nation's children. 3 The fed-
eral government, however, has never constitutionally guaranteed
the right to a public education to either handicapped or nonhandi-
capped children. In contrast, all the states, at one time or another,
have guaranteed the right to a public education in their constitu-
tions.24 The constitutions of only about one-half of the states, how-
ever, provide that a public education should be equally available to
23. The government interest in education predates the American Revolution by more
than a hundred years. In 1647, for example, the Colony of Massachusetts Bay passed an act
requiring towns of a hundred families or more to establish grammar schools. The first mea-
sure adopted by the federal government came when the Continental Congress passed an
ordinance that disposed of lands for schools. When the Constitution superseded the Articles
of Confederation, federal aid was extended to higher education. Gradually, public and pri-
vate educational institutions began receiving funds from the various levels of government.
Koenig, The Law and Education, in THE COURTS AND EDUCATION, 1-6 (C. Hooker ed. 1978).
24. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, §
1; ARK. CONsT. art. 14, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 9, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST.
art. 8, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST art. IX, § 1; GA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2-6601;
HAWAII CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1; IOWA CONsT. art. IX, § 12; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST.
art. XII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, §
2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; Mo.
CONsT. art. IX, § l(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 6; NEv. CONsT. art
XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIo CONsT. art. VI,
§ 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONsT. art. III, § 14; R.I.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art.
XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 64; VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA. CONST art. XII, § 1; Wis. CONST. art.
X, § 3; Wvo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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all.2 5 Although "all children" includes handicapped children, edu-
cational programs for the handicapped lagged behind the advance-
ments made in regular educational programs. Early educators sim-
ply did not know how to educate special children. In the days
when travel was on horseback, children with severe disabilities had
difficulty getting to school.2  In some cases, schools denied admis-
sion to handicapped children solely because of the "nauseating"
effect they had on the other children. 7
Special education classes first appeared in the 1860's.2s De-
spite the popular perception that handicapped children were
uneducable and not trainable, 9 special education increased.80 The
early special education classes eventually became a dumping
ground for those who could not adapt to the normal classroom. 1
Given the impetus of these special classes, experts gradually
learned how to implement educational strategies to meet the spe-
cial students' needs.82 An educable-uneducable dichotomy devel-
oped, but successful educational programs for the "uneducable"
eroded the distinction. During the 1950's and 1960's the scope of
special education programs8 ' expanded greatly.
25. See, e.g., IND. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 (requiring that public schools be "equally open
to all"); Miss. CONST. art. VII, § 201 (requiring that public education be provided "for all
children between the ages of 6 and 21 years"); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147 (requiring the
"establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be open to all
children of the state of North Dakota"); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1 (requiring that the state
public education system be "open to all children of the state"); Wis. CONsT. art. X, § 3,
(requiring that the public schools "be free and without charge for tuition to all children
between the ages of 4 and 20 years").
26. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 855, 871 (1975).
27. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 233-34, 172 N.W.
153, 154 (1919) ("The right of a child of school age to attend the public schools of this state
cannot be insisted upon when its presence therein is harmful to the best interests of the
school. This, like other individual rights, must be subordinated to the general welfare.").
28. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 870-76.
29. Large, supra note 21, at 215. For literature describing the historical treatment of
exceptional children, see THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS 53-194 (R. Burgdorf,
Jr. 3d ed. 1980); W. CRUICKSHANK & G. JOHNSON, EDUCATION OF Excm'TIONAL CHILDREN (3d
ed. 1975); Comment, Historical Overview from Charity to Rights, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 953 (1977).
30. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 870-75 (discussing generally the devel-
opment of education for the handicapped).
31. Id.
32. As a result, special classes for the retarded were initiated. New Jersey, for example,
was the first state to statutorily authorize classes for the mentally retarded. L. LiPPMAN & I.
GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION 5 (1973).
33. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 26, at 873.
34. Id. at 874.
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One of the judiciary's major concerns since the early 1950's
has been the establishment of a constitutionally-based right to a
free education. 5 The legal foundation for a constitutional right to
a free education derives from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,6 in which the Court
announced:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.37
Although Brown involved discrimination against black chil-
dren, the decision extended the equal protection and due process
provisions of the fourteenth amendment to all students. Educators
believed that the Brown Court's language had special relevance re-
garding the rights of disadvantaged children."8 Brown, however,
was primarily an "access" case involving a child's right of access to
a public education. 89 The Court did not address the quality of edu-
cation that should be provided to constitute access to an appropri-
ate education.' 0 Although the Court prohibited states from dis-
criminating in the area of access to their school systems, the Court
did not usurp state authority over the educational curriculum.
The Brown concept of equal access to education formed the
basis of two of the most proclaimed "right to education" decisions:
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylva-
35. See Zettel and Abeson, The Right to a Free Appropriate Public Education, in THE
COURTS AND EDUCATION at 188.
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. Id. at 493. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of an education in
several other decisions. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Illinois ex. rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
38. Weintraub and Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A
Growing Issue, 23 SvACUSE L. REv. 1037 (1972). One commentator believed that the
Court's statements were actually a warning regarding the rights of exceptional children in
public schools. Nystrand & Straub, The Courts as Educational Policy Makers, in THE
COURTS AND EDUCATION at 27, 43.
39. The Brown Court held that the dual school system of southern states discriminated
against black children. Thus, black children may not be denied access to a "white" school
simply because of their color.
40. The Court probably recognized the problem of articulating justiciably manageable
standards to enable the judiciary to question a state's objectives and the appropriateness of
its educational methods.
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nia" (PARC) and Mills v. Board of Education.42
PARC was the first judicial decision to deal specifically with
the right to education for handicapped children. In PARC, the
plaintiff brought a class action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of the state's
mentally retarded children .4  The Pennsylvania statutes denied
these children access to a publicly supported education." The
plaintiffs contended that the Pennsylvania statutes were unconsti-
tutional because they violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.' The plaintiffs further argued that before the
state could change the plaintiffs' educational placement, they were
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.4 Additionally,
the plaintiffs argued that the contested statutes violated the equal
protection clause because the statutes' presumption that certain
retarded children are uneducable and untrainable lacked a rational
basis in fact."7
An injunction, a consent agreement between the parties, and a
court order resolved the suit."' The district court's decree required
that state officials afford due process protections-notice and a
hearing-before denying a handicapped child access to an appro-
priate public education.4 0 PARC, like Brown, however, was primar-
ily an "access" decision. The court in PARC required that the state
provide disadvantaged children with a public education; the court
did not require the state, either explicitly or implicitly, to afford
disadvantaged children the same educational opportunity given to
nonhandicapped children. Nevertheless, the court held that handi-
41. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
42. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
43. 343 F. Supp. at 282.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1304, -1326, -1330, -1375 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1983).
The statutes excluded over an estimated 70,000 children from "any public education ser-
vices in schools, home or day care or other community facilities, or state residential institu-
tions." PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 296. See generally PARC v. Pennsylvania, 18 VILL. L. Rv.
277, 277-88 (1972) (generally discussing the decision).
45. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 283. The fourteenth amendment provides in relevant part
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
46. 343 F. Supp. 283.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 302. The district court viewed Pennsylvania's willingness to enter the agree-
ment as an "intelligent response to overwhelming evidence against their position." Id. at
291. For a discussion of the consent agreement, see Kuriloff, True, Kirp & Buss, Legal Re-
form and Educational Change: The Pennsylvania Case, 41 ExcmariONAL CHILDREN 35
(1974).
49. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 303.
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capped children have a constitutionally protected right to a free
education.50 The idea of denying handicapped children complete
access to a public education was quickly becoming outdated. 1
The Mills case, a district court decision, immediately followed
PARC and contained similar facts. The Mills court found that the
Board of Education of the District of Columbia had denied admis-
sion to handicapped children at the entrance level and had sus-
pended or expelled the children after they entered school.52
Neither a hearing nor a review was available to these children.58
The defendants admitted their failure to provide the plaintiffs
with access to a free education,5 4 but claimed that it would be im-
possible for them to provide the requested relief because of lack of
funds."
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the total exclusion of disadvantaged children from a
publicly supported education was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the due process clause." Additionally, the court adopted the
due process protections afforded by PARC.57 The court, however,
mentioned no requirement of a particular quality of education.
Mills is significant because of its rejection of the defendant's lack-
of-funding argument.58 After Mills, defendant school boards could
no longer assert a lack of funds as a defense for their failure to
provide access to a public education. The Mills court stated: "If
sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services
50. Id. at 302. Significantly, the district court noted that all mentally retarded persons
have the capacity to benefit from an education. Id. at 296.
51. For a full discussion of PARC, see Comment, The Handicapped Child Has a Right
to an Appropriate Education, 55 NEB. L. REV. 637, 646-50 (1976), and Kuriloff, True, Kirp
& Buss, supra note 48.
52. The plaintiff children ranged in age from seven to sixteen, had behavioral problems,
were mentally retarded, and were emotionally disturbed or hyperactive. Mills, 348 F. Supp.
at 869-70.
53. Id. at 875.
54. Id. at 871.
55. Id. at 875. The defendants contended that it would be impossible to grant the
plaintiffs the relief sought unless "'[t]hese defendants divert millions of dollars from funds
already specifically appropriated for other educational services in order to improve special
educational services. These defendants suggest that to do so would violate an Act of Con-
gress and would be inequitable to children outside the alleged plaintiff class.'" Id. (quoting
defendants' Answer). The defendants, interestingly enough, relied on Congress to protect
their actions.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 880.
58. Id. at 875-76. For another case related to the rejection of the fiscal defense, see
Kivell v. Nemointin, No. 143913 (Conn. Super. Ct., Fairfield County, 1972), discussed in,
Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 38, at 1050.
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needed . . . then the available funds must be expended equitably
in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly
supported education . . .- 9
After PARC and Mills, several suits challenged state funding
plans. Plaintiffs argued that the funding plans failed to provide
children in poor districts with access to an education." PARC and
Mills also stimulated scholarly comment. Commentators, acknowl-
edging the importance of the decisions, attempted to define the
scope of the constitutional right to an education."
The United States Supreme Court temporarily stymied the
newly developed constitutional theories in San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez.2 Rodriguez was a class action
brought on behalf of school children. The children were members
of poor families and resided in school districts having low property
tax bases.6 3 The plaintiffs based their argument on the equal pro-
59. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876. The court, while discussing the defendants' lack of fund-
ing argument, cited Goldberg v. Keller, 397 U.S. 254 (1969), which held that constitutional
rights must be afforded citizens despite the greater expense involved. Id.
60. See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) (denying mo-
tions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and holding that the Minnesota system
of public school financing, which made spending per pupil a function of the school district's
wealth, violated the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment); Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (reversing trial court's order
granting dismissal of action in a class action challenging the constitutionality of the public
school financing system under which assessed valuation within a district's boundaries deter-
mines how much the district can spend for its schools); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super.
223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972) (holding unconstitutional under the equal protection clause New
Jersey's system of financing public education in which 67% of public school costs were de-
rived from local taxes).
61. See, e.g., Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional
Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff,
Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CALw.
L. REv. 40 (1974); Schwartz, The Education of Handicapped Children: Emerging Legal
Doctrines, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 125 (1973); Shapp, The Right to an Education for the
Retarded in Pennsylvania, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1085 (1972); Weintraub & Abeson, supra
note 38; Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 Tax. L. REV. 411
(1973); Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the Mentally Re-
tarded, 34 OHIO ST. L. J. 554 (1973); Comment, The Right to Education for Mentally Re-
tarded Children, 43 UMKC L. REv. 79 (1974); Comment, Public Instruction to the Learn-
ing Disabled: Higher Hurdles for The Handicapped, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 113 (1973); Note, The
Right of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 519 (1974); Education: The Right of Retarded Children to Receive an Education
Suited to Their Needs, 77 DICK. L. REv. 577 (1973).
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). One commentator asserted that the Rodriguez decision was the
start of an era of strict construction of the equal protection clause as applied to public
education. J. HOGAN, THE SCHOOLS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 5-6 (1974).
63. The plaintiff children were either members of a minority group or were poor. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. at 5.
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tection clause and contended that because local property taxes
partly financed the school districts, poor children were not receiv-
ing an education equal to that of wealthier children. Rodriguez,
although not directly involving the handicapped, did have implica-
tions regarding the right to an education for all school-age chil-
dren, including the handicapped.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, refused to declare ed-
ucation a fundamental constitutional right and held that the
school district had not violated the equal protection clause.64 Rod-
riguez left open the question whether denial of a minimally ade-
quate education abridges a fundamental right. The Court reasoned
that whether an interest is fundamental depends not on its impor-
tance but on whether it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution."" A careful scrutiny of Rodriguez, however, sug-
gests the implicit holding that all children have a right to a mini-
mally adequate education.66 The plaintiffs never denied that they
had access to a minimally adequate education; the issue was
whether poor children had a right to receive an education commen-
surate with the education given to wealthier children. The issue in
Rodriguez was analogous to the issue in Rowley, and it is merely
the plaintiff that has changed. The Rodriguez court based its deci-
sion in part on concerns for federalism. The Court refused to hold
that disadvantaged children were entitled to receive an equal edu-
cation and noted the deference that the federal courts owe to the
states: "The consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms
with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved
for the legislative processes of the various states, and we do no vio-
lence to the values of federalism and separation of powers by stay-
ing our hand. '67
Acceptance of the proposition that Rodriguez implicitly holds
that there is a right to a minimally adequate education68 raises the
complex question of what constitutes a minimally adequate educa-
64. Id. at 35.
65. Id. at 33-34; see, e.g., Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Ac-
cess and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 75 (1980).
66. The Court stated: "Whatever merit [plaintiffs'] argument might have if a State's
financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities . . . that argu-
ment provides no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only rela-
tive differences in spending levels are involved . . . ." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
67. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58. Significantly, the Court stated: "(lit would be difficult to
imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now
before us . . . ." Id. at 44.
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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tion. Although handicapped children may have access to an educa-
tion, their particular handicaps may "constructively exclude" them
from actually learning. For example, a blind person cannot read a
book unless it is in braille. Without suitable course offerings from
which the child can benefit, there is no offering at all, and the
"minimal" requirement implicit in Rodriguez is violated. Thus, to
the extent that a disability prevents education in a normal setting,
special services must be provided.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of constructive exclu-
sion in the subsequent case of Lau v. Nichols.69 In Lau, Chinese
students who did not understand English brought an action alleg-
ing unequal educational opportunities. The students argued that
because they were not receiving instruction in the English lan-
guage,70 their education was not commensurate with that of En-
glish speaking students. The Court granted relief but specifically
declined to consider the equal protection argument the plaintiffs
had advanced.71 Instead, the Court decided the case on the basis of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.72 The Court did, however, refer to a
constitutionally based right to an appropriate education: "[T]here
is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the
same facilities. . . for students who do not understand English are
effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education. '78  The
"meaningful education" language in Lau may be extended to
handicapped children, because merely to place such children in
school is not sufficient; special services must be provided so that
handicapped children have meaningful, and not just actual, access
to education.' The Court, however, did not address the issue of
69. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
70. The Human Rights Commission of San Francisco submitted a report to the Court
showing that "no more than 1,707 of the 3,457 Chinese students" in the school "system"
needing special English instruction were receiving it. Id. at 564 n.1.
71. Id. at 566. The Chinese students had alleged that their unequal treatment violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 564.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The specific section the court relied on bars discrimination
"on the ground of race, color, or national origin . . .[in] any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance." Id. § 2000(d).
73. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
74. See Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Fialkowski, mentally
retarded children with the approximate intelligence of preschoolers were placed in a reading
and writing program despite the fact that they could neither read nor write. As a result, the
children were being constructively excluded from an education.
The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and adhered to the doctrine of
federalism as did the Rodriguez court. The court read Rodriguez to mean that a handi-
capped person may be denied a particular level of education. Id. at 958. Thus, handicapped
children need not be provided an opportunity afforded the nonhandicapped. See also Fred-
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whether a certain quality of education was constitutionally
required.
B. The Statutory Framework
The judiciary, it is argued, should not interfere in the area of
education. Adherents to this position argue that courts lack judi-
cially manageable standards by which to determine the level of ed-
ucation a state should provide its handicapped children.7 5 As a re-
sult, state and local educational authorities have traditionally had
broad authority over educational programs for handicapped chil-
dren. This broad authority, however, has not been used in favor of
the handicapped .7  The high cost of educating the disadvantaged
has exacerbated the problem.7" Prior to the enactment of the
EAHCA, less than one-half of the nation's handicapped children
were receiving an appropriate education and almost one-quarter
were receiving no educational services at all. 8
erick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (denial of motion to dismiss), 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977). Yet the Fialkowski court also believed that
Rodriguez was consistent with the proposition that there exists a constitutional right to a
certain minimal level of education under the fourteenth amendment. 405 F. Supp. at 958.
Courts have taken different positions on the constitutionality of a denial of public edu-
cation to a handicapped child. See, e.g., Special Educ. Div. of Dept. of Pub. Transp. v. G.H.,
218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974) (denial of equal education to handicapped child violated
equal protection guarantee under state constitution); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (denial did not infringe a fundamental
constitutional right); cf. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (where dispro-
portionate number of blacks placed in classes for mentally retarded based on exam results
constituted plaintiffs' established denial of equal protection), aft'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1974).
75. See Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Dis-
abled Children, 12 VAL. U.L. REv. 253, 275 (1978).
76. With the broad authority in educational programs came a wide discretion to label
children as handicapped and thus deprive them of an education. See, e.g., Watson v. City of
Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1938) (good faith determination by school officials
to exclude a child from school because he was too "weak minded" not subject to judicial
review). A complete summary of state statutes describing handicapped children and limiting
education for the handicapped may be found in the legislative history of the EAHCA. S.
REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1425, 1444-45.
77. The high cost of educating the handicapped also prevented court decisions recog-
nizing the rights of the handicapped from being implemented. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1424, 1431.
78. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1432. This was true even though many states had passed laws helping the hand-
icapped. For example, in Indiana, even though a 1969 Special Education Act mandated that
each county develop a program to serve all handicapped children by 1973, 128 of the 305
schools did not have programs for teaching disabled children as of the 1976-1977 school
year. Only 28% of the state's learning disabled children were served during the 1975-1976
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To alleviate the plight of the handicapped, Congress in 1965
began to provide legislative and fiscal support to ensure that hand-
icapped children would receive an education. The Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ELSEA)79 was the first in a se-
ries of laws that described the role of the federal government in
the education of the handicapped. ELSEA funded state programs
to assist educationally deprived children. Implementation was left
to the discretion of local educational agencies. In 1966, ELSEA was
amended8" to include specific provisions for handicapped children.
It was not until 1968, however, that Congress enacted the Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act, a statute exclusively concerned with
the needs of the handicapped. 8 A 1970 amendment82 to this Act
combined related provisions of earlier legislation.8 The 1970
amendment was expanded in 1974.84
In spite of these congressional efforts, many handicapped chil-
dren were still not being appropriately educated."8 Finally, in 1975
Congress enacted the EAHCA. 5 This Act represents an ambitious
school year and that increased to about 33% for 1976-1977. Levinson, supra note 75, at 284-
85.
79. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
80. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80
Stat. 1191, 1204. Through these provisions, Congress authorized grants so that the states
could initiate or improve education programs.
81. Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 804 (1968). This law was designed to establish experi-
mental programs that could serve as models for state and local educational agencies. The
Act proved especially beneficial; after its passage, federal assistance grew from $2.5 million
to $100 million. 121 CONG. REc. 23,703 (1975).
82. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970).
83. The incorporated legislation included the Handicapped Children's Early Education
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 90-538, §§ 1-5, 82 Stat. 901-02 (1968) and provisions for teacher
training in fields related to education of the handicapped that appeared in the Act of Sept.
6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-926, 72 Stat. 1777.
84. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat.
579-85 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982)). The provisions of this Act required the
states to: establish a goal of extending full educational opportunities to the handicapped;
extend procedural safeguards to parents and guardians; ensure that, to the maximum extent
appropriate, handicapped children are educated with nonhandicapped children; remove
handicapped children from the normal classroom only when their handicap is so severe that
education in regular classrooms could not be achieved; and, ensure that classification and
placement decisions would be selected in a racially or culturally nondiscriminatory fashion.
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWs 1425,
1431.
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982). For a general survey of legislation prior to the develop-
ment of case law, see Altschuler, Education _for the Handicapped, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 523
(1978); Baugh, The Federal Legislation on Equal Educational Opportunity for the Handi-
capped, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 65 (1978); Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 110 (1976). For a full discussion of the statutory predecessors
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effort to promote the education of handicapped children, and was
passed in response to Congress's perception that a majority of this
group of children "were either totally excluded from schools or
[were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when
they were old enough to 'drop out.' ,,87 Congress relied heavily on
PARC and Mills in writing the EAHCA because it recognized that
these decisions guaranteed the right to a free publicly supported
education."
The major purpose of the EAHCA is to provide all handi-
capped children,89 regardless of the severity of their handicap, 90
with a "free appropriate public education" in the least restrictive
environment. The EAHCA defines "a free appropriate public edu-
cation" as "special education and related services . . . which are
provided in conformity with [an] individualized education pro-
gram" (IEP).91 Special education is "specially designed instruction
. . . to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child."9" The IEP
is a written plan for each child, developed at a meeting among the
child's parents, his teacher, and a school representative." Although
to the EAHCA, see Semmel and Heinmiller, The Education of All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975: National Perspectives and Long Range Implications, 53 ViEwpoINTs, Mar.
1977, at 1.
87. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)).
88. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1425, 1430, 1432; Stafford, supra note 22, at 74.
89. "The term 'handicapped children' means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf,
speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically im-
paired, or other health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who
by reason thereof require special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982).
90. The state shall ensure that "all children ... who are handicapped, regardless of the
severity of their handicap" receive special education and related services. Id. § 1412(2)(C).
Additionally, a local educational agency that desires to receive funds under the EAHCA
must provide assurance that funds will be used for handicapped children, "regardless of the
severity of their handicap." Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A).
91. Id. § 1401(18) (1982). Congress did not attempt to specifically define a "free appro-
priate public education," (see supra note 15), but instead used the IEP as a baseline mecha-
nism. See Stafford, supra note 22, at 75. One court interpreted an "appropriate education"
to require educational programs designed to maximize the self-sufficiency of the handi-
capped child. Arjnstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd on other grounds
sub nom., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Scan-
lon v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1982).
93. The IEP shall include: 1) a statement of the present level of performance of the
child; 2) a statement of short and long-term goals; 3) a statement of the specific educational
services to be made available to the child, and the extent to which the child may enroll in
regular programs; 4) the date such services shall start and how long they shall be provided;
and 5) appropriate criteria by which to determine if objectives are being achieved. Id. §
1401(19).
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the EAHCA does not specify the substantive requirements that a
program should have, if the plan does not meet with the parents'
approval, 4 the parents are entitled to an "impartial due process
hearing" before a hearing examiner.9s The parents may then ap-
peal to the state agency for review of the local decision.9  If the
administrative procedures fail to resolve the conflicts, a civil suit
may be brought in a state or federal court,97 which may then de-
cide the case based on a preponderance of the evidence.9 8
The importance of the EAHCA lies in its funding. While
drafting the EAHCA, Congress was concerned about the financial
difficulties a funding statute would encounter. An early proposal
required outlays on each handicapped child equal to half of the
average per pupil expenditure.9 9 Congress later abandoned this ex-
pensive goal,100 and reduced the maximum entitlement a state may
receive from an original authorization of $680 million per year to
$100 million for 1976 and $200 million for 1977.10 The amount of
funding a state receives is now based on the number of handi-
capped children in a given state. 102 The number, however, may not
exceed "12 per centum. . . of the number of all children aged five
94. The parents will have "an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or
the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." Id. § 1415(b)(1)(E).
95. Id. § 1415(b)(2). Whenever a complaint is received "the parents or guardian shall
have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the
state educational agency or by the local educational agency or intermediate educational
unit." The hearing officer cannot be an employee of the agency involved in the education of
the child. Id.
96. Id § 1415(c). Although most states have established procedures whereby an initial
hearing takes place at the local level and is followed, when necessary, by an appeal to a state
hearing officer, the EAHCA does not require a two-tiered system. Id. § 1415(b)(2).
97. Id. § 1415(e)(2). An aggrieved party "shall have the right to bring a civil action with
respect to the complaint presented . . . which action may be brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the
amount in controversy." Id.
98. Id.
99. 121 CONG. REc. 25,526 (1975).
100. Congress's response was a result of two factors: an astronomical $3.8 billion was
needed to achieve the EAHCA's purposes, 121 CONG. REc. 23,704 (1975), and an anticipated
Presidential veto, 121 CONG. REc. 25,534 (1975). The Education For All Handicapped Chil-
dren Act: Opening the Schoolhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. L. REv. & Soc. CHANGE 43, 47 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Opening the Schoolhouse Door].
101. 121 CONG. REc. 37,024 (1975). The amount of funds the states may receive in 1982
is dramatically larger than the 1978 figure. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1)(B) (1982). The
EAHCA's escalating funding schedule indicates a change in federal and state priorities in
favor of educating the handicapped. Opening the Schoolhouse Door, supra note 100, at 49-
50.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1)(A) (1982).
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to seventeen, in the State." ' s The funds are to be spent on a prior-
ity basis: first with respect to children not receiving an education,
and second with respect to children with the most severe handi-
caps receiving an inadequate education. °'0
Congressional debate over the EAHCA centered on whether
federal funds should be used for education, a traditional state con-
cern.10 5 Congress did not want the federal government to usurp
traditional state responsibilities;106 as a result, Congress allowed
the states to administer the EAHCA. 0 7 Because Congress strongly
favored local control, seventy-five percent of the funds allocated to
a state were distributed to local educational agencies, and the state
educational agencies retained control of the remainder.108 The re-
sulting legislation was, however, myopic in one respect. The
EAHCA includes a "mainstreaming" requirement that has caused
school officials great problems.
The mainstreaming requirement provides that an appropriate
education take place in the least restrictive environment.'0 9 In
other words, handicapped children should be placed in the "main-
stream" and educated with other nonhandicapped children. The
integration of handicapped children into the regular classroom has
been proven to improve their performance substantially.1 0 As a re-
suit, separate schooling is to be considered only as a last resort for
the severely handicapped child. Mainstreaming, however, has not
lived up to Congress's expectations. There are three problems asso-
ciated with the mainstreaming requirement. First, it imposes a ser-
103. Id. § 1411(a)(5)(A)(i).
104. S. RmP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1439.
105. 121 CONG. REc. 19,478 (1975).
106. 121 CONG. REC. 25,526 (1975). Because no new federal mechanism was established,
state educational agencies will be responsible for the administration of the EAHCA. Id. at
19,478 (1975).
107. This demonstrates Congress's reluctance to encroach on state authority. See 121
CONG. REC. 19,478 (1975).
108. 20 U.S.C. 1411(c) (1982). For a detailed discussion of the form and role of state
education agencies, EMERGING STATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EDUCATION 37-80 (1970).
109. The state must adopt "procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appro-
priate, handicapped children . . . are educated with children who are not handicapped
..... " 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1982). Any other alternative may be seen as "restrictive." A
restrictive environment limits the way teachers and students view the child and could injure
the child's chances of becoming self-sufficient. See R. MARTIN, EDUCATING HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN: THE LEGAL MANDATE 85 (1979). Mainstreaming is a response to the practice of
placing handicapped children in institutions. Many schools did not favor having "slow" chil-
dren in their classrooms. See Large, supra note 21, at 2440.
110. S. KIRK, EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 199-201 (2d ed. 1972).
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ious financial burden on the states that have to prepare teachers
for participation in different programs for different types of handi-
caps."' Second, some disabilities are less adaptable than others to
a normal classroom setting. For example, a wheelchair-bound per-
son would obviously benefit from mainstreaming, while a deaf per-
son would probably need intricate special services. Third, there are
no set standards as to when mainstreaming is appropriate. Al-
though parents may believe an education program that denies
mainstreaming is unreasonable, school districts may find their pro-
grams to be "appropriate." This was precisely the predicament in-
volved in Rowley. Consequently, Rowley would never have arisen if
the EAHCA did not require mainstreaming n 2 I
II. EVALUATION OF THE RowleyCouRT's REASONING
In Rowley, a five person majority of the Supreme Court 1 ' de-
cided that under the EAHCA a state is not required to maximize
the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the
opportunity provided to nonhandicapped children.114 The Court
111. Aware of this problem, the National Educational Association has become critical
of mainstreaming. It has noted that mainstreaming would be successful only with proper
teacher preparation, alterations of class size and curricula, appropriate services and ade-
quate funds solely for the purpose of mainstreaming. National Educational Association, Pol-
icy Resolution #26 (Mainstreaming) in Resolutions, Business and Other Actions (1975) at
21-22. Massachusetts has been mainstreaming its handicapped children since 1974 under a
statute similar to the EAHCA. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B (West 1982). Most of the
teachers, however, were dissatisfied with the concept because they did not feel adequately
prepared to deal with the added responsibilities. See Andelman, Mainstreaming in Massa-
chusetts Under Law 766, TODAY'S EDUCATION, Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 20.
112. Prior to the EAHCA, many states recognized the expense of educating deaf chil-
dren and established regional facilities for the deaf. If a large enough group of deaf children
are brought together, extra expenditures for special equipment can be justified. Further-
more, a more diversified faculty with special expertise can be made available. A final advan-
tage of placing handicapped children together is that more around-the-clock support for the
deaf can be provided. See Large, supra note 21, at 244-48.
113. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in which
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun con-
curred in the judgment of the majority but not in its reasoning. Id. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). He believed that the relevant question was not whether an IEP is reasonably
calculated to produce educational benefits but whether the program, viewed as a whole,
offers the handicapped child an educational opportunity that is substantially equal to the
opportunity provided to a nonhandicapped child. Id. at 211. He concluded that Amy was
given such an opportunity. Justice Blackmun's analysis and conclusion are flawed, however,
because his inquiry is substantially the same as that propounded by the lower courts. Amy
was not provided with a "substantially equal opportunity" because she could not under-
stand everything said to her. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Justice White, wrote
a scathing dissent in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
114. Additionally, the Court considered a court's inquiry in an action brought under
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
held that a state satisfies the EAHCA's requirement for a "free
appropriate public education" by providing personalized instruc-
tion with sufficient support services to make it possible for the
handicapped child to benefit educationally." To arrive at this
holding, the Court analyzed the express words of the EAHCA, the
legislative history behind the Act, and the judicial decisions that
Congress relied upon in enacting the bill, to ascertain the meaning
of a "free appropriate public education." This holding is also based
on the doctrine of federalism as well as on a recognition of the
practical difficulties that would result from reading the "free ap-
propriate public education" requirement to mean that handi-
capped children are to receive an education that is equal to that of
nonhandicapped children.
The district court in Rowley found that the EAHCA did not
define the term "free appropriate public education" at all."' The
court examined the regulations accompanying the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973"' to formulate its definition of an "appropriate educa-
tion."" 8 These regulations provide that an "appropriate educa-
tion" is "the provision of regular or special education and related
aids and services that . . . are designed to meet individual educa-
tional needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of
nonhandicapped persons are met."" 9 Support for the district
court's analysis may be found in a statement by Senator Robert
Stafford of Vermont."10 Senator Stafford stated that if any doubts
exist regarding the intent of Congress in enacting the EAHCA, the
doubts may be resolved by looking at the Rehabilitation Act and
the regulations promulgated thereunder.' 2 ' All members of Con-
gress, however, did not share Senator Stafford's view. 2 Further-
the EAHCA to be twofold. First, the court must ask whether the state complied with the
procedures set forth in the Act; and second, whether the IEP developed through the Act's
procedures is reasonably calculated to assure that the child receives educational benefits.
458 U.S. at 206-07.
115. Id. at 203.
116. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 533.
117. PUB. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975)).
118. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 533. The regulations may be found at 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)
(1983).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b) (1983).
120. Senator Stafford was an ardent supporter of the EAHCA. See 121 CoNG. REC.
19,483 (1975).
121. See Stafford, supra note 22, at 79-80.
122. Senator Stafford was one of the few Senators who believed that the EAHCA was
an effort to afford handicapped children an educational opportunity equal to that received
by nonhandicapped children. See infra note 138.
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more, the legislative history of the EAHCA and the regulations
promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act, make no reference to
the Rehabilitation Act as providing a supplement for determining
the congressional intent behind the EAHCA. Finally, the argument
can be made that since Congress could have placed a commensu-
rate educational opportunities requirement in the EAHCA, and
did not do so, Congress did not intend to provide the requirement.
The defendant school board disagreed with the district court's
definition of an "appropriate education" and contended that the
term was defined in the EAHCA itself.123 The plaintiffs agreed but
argued that the statutory definition is not "functional" and there-
fore "offers judges no guidance in their consideration of controver-
sies involving the 'identification, evaluation, or educational place-
ment of the child or of the provision of a free appropriate public
education.' "124
The Supreme Court found that the EAHCA does specifically
define the expression1 25 but stated that the definition "tends to-
ward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive."12 6 The Court
concluded that the search for legislative intent must not be aban-
doned.1 27 The Court believed that the judiciary's function in statu-
tory interpretation is to construe what Congress has written, and
not to add, subtract, delete, or distort the language of a statute.1 2 8
The Court's adherence to the express definition in the Act is con-
sistent with precedent. However, to determine whether the Court's
definition of "appropriate" is consistent with congressional intent,
the legislative history must be examined.
In examining the language of the EAHCA's legislative his-
tory, 1 29 Justice Rehnquist noted the repeated references in the leg-
islative history to the number of handicapped children not receiv-
ing any education at all1 30 and concluded that "the intent of the
123. 458 U.S. at 187. The defendants argued that Section 1401(18) defined an appropri-
ate education. See supra note 15.
124. 458 U.S. at 187 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 287).
125. 458 U.S. at 187-88. The Court agreed with the defendants that section 1401(18) of
the EAHCA defined a "free appropriate public education." See supra note 15.
126. 458 U.S. at 188.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 190 n.11 (citing 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951));
see also Stafford, supra note 22, at 75.
129. 458 U.S. at 191; see generally Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 154 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., writing for the majority, interpreted the statute at hand according to the plain
language of the statute and its legislative history).
130. 458 U.S. at 191. The Senate Conference Report on the EAHCA recognized that
over half of the estimated eight million handicapped children in the country did not receive
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EAHCA was more to open the door of public education to handi-
capped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any par-
ticular level of education once inside."'' The dissent, on the other
hand, concluded that because the statements urging equal educa-
tional opportunities for the handicapped sometimes followed state-
ments within the EAHCA's legislative history concerning the per-
centage of handicapped children not receiving an appropriate
education, Congress not only wanted to bring handicapped chil-
dren into the classroom but also wanted them to benefit from the
education offered to them.' Justice White's dissent is problematic
for three reasons. First, the dissent fails to discern that the oppor-
tunity to benefit educationally was precisely the test Justice Rehn-
quist expounded.' 3 Second, the dissent asserts contradictory pro-
positions. Justice White first states: "Certainly the language of the
[EAHCA] contains no requirement like the one imposed by the
lower courts-that states maximize the potential of handicapped
children commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children.' 3 4 He then asserts that: "The basic floor of opportunity
is . . . as the courts below recognized, intended to eliminate the
effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be
given an equal opportunity to learn."'3 3 Third, the dissent's most
obvious flaw in reasoning is its failure to consider the immense
burden that the implementation of a commensurate educational
opportunity standard would place on the states.
The EAHCA's legislative history supports Justice Rehnquist's
position that handicapped children need not be provided with a
commensurate educational opportunity. Congress enacted the
EAHCA to provide for some priority in the allocation of funds for
the education of the most needy handicapped children, that is,
those not receiving any education at all, and those receiving an in-
adequate education.' The dissent is correct in stressing'3 7 that
during debate, several congressmen referred to the EAHCA as an
an adequate education, over one million received no education at all, and that in Congress's
view, the educational needs of handicapped children could be met. S. RE. No. 168, 94th
Cong., lot Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1432-33.
131. 458 U.S. at 192.
132. Id. at 213 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 201.
134. Id. at 212-13 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
136. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 1425, 1438, 1439, 1441, 1442, 1446.
137. 458 U.S. at 213-14 (White, J., dissenting).
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effort to afford handicapped children an equal educational oppor-
tunity.3 8 Additionally, the legislative history states that "Congress
must take a more active role under its responsibility for equal pro-
tection of the laws to guaranty that handicapped children are pro-
vided equal educational opportunity."' 9 These words, however, are
weakened by the statement that follows them: "It can no longer be
the policy of the Government to merely establish an unenforceable
goal requiring all children to be in school. '" 0 This statement can
be read to require that a child should be placed in a program tai-
lored to overcome the effects of his handicap and thus should not
be constructively excluded from education.
These statements, however, are merely isolated assertions con-
cerning the achievement of a commensurate educational opportu-
nity. It was far more common for congressmen to speak of afford-
ing handicapped children "full" educational opportunity or simply
appropriate education.1 4 ' As the Rowley Court noted, "passing ref-
erences . ..are not controlling when analyzing a legislative his-
tory."I" Moreover, Rowley is consistent with prior federal court
decisions.
According to Brown, the fourteenth amendment requires that
an education be available to all persons. 43 Brown, however, did not
interpret the fourteenth amendment to require an equal quality of
education. Furthermore, in noting that the PARC and Mills deci-
sions influenced the EAHCA, 1 4 the Rowley Court found that these
decisions stood for the proposition that handicapped children
could not be denied access to a free education, not that they must
receive an equal education. '4 5 Although there is language in Mills
to suggest that an equal education must be provided,' 46 Justice
Rehnquist's findings were correct because both PARC and Mills
138. See, e.g., 121 CONG. Rc. 19,483 (1975) (remarks of Senator Stafford); 121 CONG.
REC. 37,030 (1975) (remarks of Representative Mink); see also Stafford, supra note 22, at
71.
139. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1433.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1441 (remarks of Representative Randolph); 121 CONG. REc. 19,494
(1975) (remarks of Senator Javits).
142. 458 U.S. at 204 n.26 (quoting United States Dep't of State v. Washington Post Co.,
456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982)).
143. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
144. 458 U.S. at 199.
145. Id.
146. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875.
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involved children who were totally excluded from a publicly sup-
ported education.1 4 7 The subsequent cases of Rodriguez and Lau
also buttress Justice Rehnquist's conclusion. Rodriguez and Lau
held that there is a right to a minimum education, not that there is
a right to an equal education. s14 As long as the handicapped child
is in school, and special services have been provided to ensure that
the handicap does not constructively exclude him from an educa-
tion, a handicapped child's rights have not been abridged.
In holding that the EAHCA's provision for a "free appropriate
public education" does not require a commensurate educational
opportunity, the Rowley Court implicitly recognized the delicate
federal and state relationship in the area of education.149 Specifi-
cally, the Rowley Court interpreted the EAHCA as endowing the
states with "[t]he primary responsibility for formulating the edu-
cation to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the
educational method most suitable to the child's needs." 150
The Court concluded that it was highly unlikely that Congress
intended that reviewing courts overturn a state's educational the-
ory.1 51 In the Court's view, the EAHCA's purpose was solely to ex-
tend funds to states to assist them in educating the handi-
capped,15 2 and Congress clearly recognized the primacy of the
states in the field of education. "  This view is supported by the
fact that the EAHCA does not tell school authorities what to teach
but rather sets forth in general terms the procedures that must be
followed before a particular program may be said to meet the re-
quirements of the Act. One may nonetheless argue that the
EAHCA intervenes in an area where state supremacy has long
been recognized.
In Epperson v. Arkansas1 5 4 the Supreme Court stated: "By
147. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
149. The Burger Court has been extremely deferential to the authority of the states in
the federal system; it has given greater deference to the states than did the Warren Court.
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act which ex-
tended the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour requirements to almost all employees
of the states and their political subdivisions).
150. 458 U.S. at 207.
151. Id. at 207-08.
152. Id. at 208.
153. 121 CONG. REC. 19,498 (1975) (Senator Dole remarking, "Historically, the States
have had the primary responsibility for the education of children at the elementary and
secondary level.") See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
154. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, a high school teacher and a parent of two school-
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and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the con-
trol of the state and local authorities.' 55 Epperson recognized,
however, that courts may intervene when the operation of school
systems sharply implicates basic constitutional values. 15 Court in-
tervention in the area of public education is also justified because
an education is necessary for the performance of other constitu-
tionally recognized rights.157 Because the Rowley Court recognized
the basic right to an education, it held that under the EAHCA a
handicapped child must be able to receive benefits from an educa-
tion, and mere access to an education is not sufficient. On the
other hand, by not going so far as to hold that the EAHCA man-
dates state implementation of a commensurate educational oppor-
tunity standard, the Court avoided placing an unbearable financial
burden on states.
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee's Report es-
timated that the average cost of educating a handicapped child is
double the cost of educating a nonhandicapped child."" During the
first three years following the effective date of the EAHCA's regu-
lation there was an increase of nearly 328,000 handicapped chil-
dren served. Thus, as of 1982, over 3.8 million children were eligi-
ble to receive special services under the Act. " An additional
aged children brought suit in a state court to challenge the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute making the teaching of evolution a misdemeanor. The Court held that the statute vio-
lated the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment. Id. at 109.
155. Id. at 104. In the areas of curriculum and classroom speech, for example, courts
have almost unanimously upheld the authority of the state. See Parker v. Board of Educ.,
237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), afl'd, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030
(1966); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
156. 393 U.S. at 104.
157. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36. In Rodriguez, however, because of federalism
concerns, the Court refused to recognize education as a fundamental right. Id. at 44. See
supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
One commentator sharply criticized the Court's reasoning in Rodriguez and found four
flaws with the Court's proposition that education is not a fundamental right. Preovolos,
supra note 65, at 103-13. First, even though education is not an explicit constitutional right,
"education occupies a special place in the constitutional plan." Id. at 108. Second, states
recognize "the primacy of the education right . . . on the basis of its significance in the
federal democratic scheme." Id. Third, citizens expect an education; education is perceived
as a national right. Fourth, because education involves state action, states should not be
allowed to act in a way that would burden citizens who are exercising their rights. Id.
Rodriguez, however, does not stand for the proposition that there is no right to a mini-
mally adequate education. It simply holds that education is not a fundamental right guaran-
teed by the Constitution.
158. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1439.
159. STATE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES BRANCH, OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
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problem was that Congress did not intend for the EAHCA to pay
for all the costs of educating handicapped children. 160 Hence, had
Rowley imposed the requirement of a commensurate educational
opportunity, the states might have been burdened to the point
where they would have chosen not to subject themselves to the
provisions of the EAHCA.'61
The Supreme Court's reluctance to impose serious financial
burdens on states in the area of education is also manifest in the
pre-Rowley decision of Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman."' In Pennhurst, a resident of the state hospital for
the retarded brought a class action alleging that the Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,68 which
provides for "appropriate treatment" of the retarded, 16  created
substantive rights.'"
Pennhurst is similar to Rowley because the plaintiffs in Rowl-
ey argued that the EAHCA provided a substantive right to special
services that would nullify the effect of a handicap. The Pennhurst
Court rejected the plaintiff's argument and held that absent a
stated intention to do so, Congress does not legislate to secure the
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, because such legislation
imposes federal authority involuntarily on the states and often
usurps traditional state functions. 1" The Court refused to assume
that Congress has an unstated intent to enforce the fourteenth
amendment. The Pennhurst Court reasoned that the argument for
inferring intent is weakest when Congress places affirmative obliga-
TiON OF PUBLIC LAW 94-142; THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT 107-08
(1980). Even before the EAHCA, from 1967 to 1975, enrollment of the handicapped in pub-
lic schools increased by 1.5 million. See 121 CONG. REc. 19,482 (1975).
160. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1425, 1437 (The EAHCA "is designed to establish basic minimum procedures
governing the distribution of federal funds for assistance to the states for the education of
all handicapped children .... .") (emphasis added). Although the amount of funds states
received grew from five percent of the average per pupil expenditure in 1978 to forty percent
in 1982, 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1)(B) (1982), federal funds cover less than one quarter of the
total education cost. 121 CONG. REc. 25,536 (1975).
161. Forty-nine states have chosen to receive federal funds and have therefore sub-
jected themselves to the compliance mechanisms of the EAHCA. New Mexico is the sole
exception. Note, supra note 16, at 1105 n.18.
162. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-81 (1976). Like the EAHCA, this Act is voluntary and the states
are given the choice of complying with its conditions or foregoing federal funding. Id. at §
6063.
164. Id. at §§ 6010(1)-(2).
165. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5.
166. Id. at 16.
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tions on the states to fund certain services, because this imposes
"massive financial obligations on the states."16 Pennhurst is con-
sistent with a number of cases" 8 that hold that only an expressly
articulated intent can manifest Congress's desire to legislate pursu-
ant to the fourteenth amendment.' e Like the statute in question
in Pennhurst, the EAHCA does not expressly state that Congress
is legislating pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. In light of
Pennhurst, one may argue that the EAHCA was not a congres-
sional attempt to legislate under the fourteenth amendment 17 0 be-
cause the EAHCA, like the statute at issue in Pennhurst, imposes
an affirmative obligation on states to fund certain services."7
Hence, Rowley is correct in holding that the requirement of a "free
appropriate public education" does not require that handicapped
children be given the same educational opportunity as that given
to nonhandicapped children. Pennhurst and Rowley are also simi-
lar in that Congress enacted the statute at issue in each case pur-
suant to its spending power. 17
Legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is in the
nature of a contract. States agree to comply with federal conditions
in return for federal funds. Thus, the inquiry is whether the state
has voluntarily and knowlingly accepted the terms of the con-
tract.17 To allow such inquiry, Congress must state the conditions
of the contract unambiguously.17' Congress, in enacting the
EAHCA, legislated pursuant to the spending power, because under
the EAHCA, a state will receive federal funds only if the state
167. Id. at 17.
168. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1975); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
169. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 16.
170. Although Congress stated that it was relying on the PARC and Mills decisions, S.
REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 1425,
1430, those decisions involved equal protection and due process rights. The protections af-
forded by PARC and Mills extend only to access to a free education. See supra notes 41-59
and accompanying text. In the instant case we are involved with the question of whether
handicapped children should receive an opportunity to learn commensurate with the oppor-
tunity given to nonhandicapped children. In the EAHCA's legislative history Congress does
not rely on any case to extend fourteenth amendment protection to this situation, nor is
there any other evidence of its intent to do so.
171. Lack of funds is no defense for a state that does not provide handicapped children
with access to a public education. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 866.
172. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
173. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937)).
174. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, (citing as a comparison Employees of Dep't of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
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agrees to comply with the conditions imposed by the Act. Neither
the EAHCA, nor its legislative history expresses an unambiguous
intent to provide a commensurate educational opportunity to a
handicapped child. Additional support for the Rowley Court's de-
cision can be found in the lack of agreement among educators as to
what programs are most effective for handicapped children. " '
In the Rowley case, at least three experts called by the defen-
dant were of the opinion that a sign language interpreter would not
make a significant difference in Amy's education. 17" However, ex-
perts called on by the plaintiff believed that the best education for
any deaf person would include the services of a sign language in-
terpreter.1"7 Thus, if the EAHCA was read to require that a handi-
capped child receive an educational opportunity commensurate
with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children, an in-
crease in litigation would result. Parents of handicapped children
.would have experts testify at trial who believe that certain services
must be provided for an equal opportunity, while school boards
might present the testimony of experts with different opinions.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's contention that the goal of the
EAHCA is to provide absolute equality of educational opportu-
nity17 8 is inapposite, because "it assumes that all children have in-
nate capabilities for common educational attainments.' 7' The pro-
ponents of the commensurate educational opportunity standard
erroneously assume that testing procedures exist that can deter-
mine a child's capabilities. Although testing procedures may exist
when the handicap only involves sensory impairment, 80 testing
procedures might not exist when intellectual impairment is pre-
sent. Furthermore, the tasks for which severely handicapped chil-
dren are trained and the educational information handicapped
children receive are not comparable to the education provided non-
175. See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies
and Procedural Proposals, 62 CALip. L. REv. 40, 47 (1974).
176. Rowley, 632 F.2d 945, 950-51 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Susan Williams, a teacher
of deaf children and Amy's tutor, testified that "a sign language interpreter would not make
a significant difference in Amy's education, but would, on the contrary deter her interac-
tions with her teachers and other children. . . ." Id. at 950. Ellen Garzione, a hearing ther-
apist who also worked with Amy, corroborated this testimony. Id. Finally, Dr. Ann Mulhol-
land, an expert audiologist, "testified on the basis of her clinical experience with Amy's case
that Amy's education was appropriate and adequate." Id. at 951.
177. See Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 535.
178. 458 U.S. at 198.
179. Weintraub & Abeson, supra note 38, at 1055.
180. For example, in Amy's case it was possible to determine her potential by compar-
ing tests administered orally with tests administered by sign. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 532.
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handicapped children. As a result, academic equality cannot be
achieved.'8'
In short, the Rowley Court was justified in rejecting the dis-
trict court's definition of a "free appropriate public education" and
in equating the term with the receipt of specialized services that
are designed to alleviate the particular handicap involved and en-
able the child to receive educational benefits.182 The express lan-
guage of the EAHCA, the Act's legislative history, and previous
court decisions, as well as federalism and concern over the adverse
impact that a commensurate educational opportunity standard
would have on state educational systems, justify the Court's
outcome. 83
181. Assuming academic equality could be achieved, to provide the myriad of services a
profoundly retarded child would need in order to somehow approach "equality", would re-
sult in an inequitable sharing of resources. See Large, supra note 21, at 242. Mills, however,
requires that "[i]f sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and pro-
grams that are needed. . . then the available funds must be expended equitably in such a
manner that no child is entirely excluded from a[n] ... education .... " Mills, 348 F.
Supp. at 876.
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982) provides that related services are necessary "to assist a
handicapped child to benefit from special education ...
183. Immediately following the treatment of what is meant by an "appropriate educa-
tion," the Court went on to discuss the scope of judicial review as stated in the EAHCA.
The plaintiffs contended that the EAHCA requires courts to exercise de nova review over
state decisions and policies. 458 U.S. at 205. The defendants contended that courts have the
authority to review the Act's procedural requirements but have no authority to review the
substance of the state program. Id.
The Court in formulating its version of the appropriate standard of judicial review
reached a conciliatory ground between the plaintiffs' and the defendant's contentions. The
Court held that a reviewing court must make two inquiries. First, the court must ask
whether the state has complied with the procedures set forth in the Act. Id. at 206. The
second inquiry of a reviewing court is whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits. Id. at 206-07.
A close scrutiny of the Court's analysis concerning the appropriate judicial review
reveals three flaws. First, the Court places emphasis on the fact that the provisions for judi-
cial review are found in the section providing for procedural safeguards. Id. at 205-06; see
U.S.C. § 1415 (1982). But as the dissent pointed out, "Where else would a provision for
judicial review belong?" Rowley, 458 U.S. at 216 (White, J., dissenting). The Court also
emphasized that if the procedural requirements of the EAHCA are met, the substantive
content of an IEP would probably also be sufficient. Id. at 206. If this is true, then why did
the Court formulate a second prong to a court's inquiry during judicial review, namely,
whether an IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?
Second, although the Court rejected the assertion that judicial review should not extend
to the substance of an educational program, the Court failed to state'whether the parties
would be bound by the record of the hearing officer or would be entitled to present addi-
tional evidence. Section 1415 of the EAHCA provides that "[in any action [brought under
the EAHCA] the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings [and]
shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party. "20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(1982). This
provision suggests that the role of the court is to make an independent determination and
not simply to accept the findings of a hearing officer when supported by substantial evi-
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III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
A. Quality Education for the Handicapped
Board of Education v. Rowley is a case of first impression.
The decision represents the first time that the United States Su-
preme Court has been called upon to interpret a provision of the
EAHCA.'" Lower courts had previously interpreted the statute,
particularly the requirement of a "free appropriate public educa-
tion," in various ways.18 5 Ignoring these interpretations, the Su-
dence. Several lower court decisions have recognized this interpretation. See, e.g., Laura M.
v. Special School Dist. No. 1, [1980-81 Decisions] EDuc. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR)
552:152 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 1980) (under the EAHCA's scope of review no special deference
need be given to the hearing officer's decision); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211,
1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated, 623 F.2d 248 (1980) (interpreting the language of section
1415 to mean that the proceedings were to be conducted as a "de novo" hearing); see also
Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Wis. 1980), affd, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.
1981); Ladson v. Board of Educ. [1979-80 Decisions] EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR)
551:188 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 1979); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466
F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
Third, the Supreme Court in Rowley failed to recognize that a reviewing court may on
its own initiative provide appropriate relief. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982) (requiring a
court to "hear additional evidence and to grant the relief it deems appropriate"). The re-
viewing court is therefore not limited merely to affirming or invalidating the administrative
decision and may mandate a particular educational program if it finds that the existing
educational program does not benefit a child. A reviewing court, however, should not exer-
cise its authority under section 1415 to totally revise a particular educational program.
Courts lack specialized knowledge in the area of education and as a result should be cau-
tious in interfering with the informed judgment of state administrators. In Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court recognized that education presents a myriad of "intractable economic, so-
cial, and even philosophical problems." 411 U.S. at 42 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 487 (1970)). The lack of agreement among educators further dictates against a
court's deciding which substantive educational programs would be most beneficial for a
handicapped child.
It may be argued, therefore, that a narrow reading of the Rowley Court's reasonableness
standard is the only practical standard of review. The majority's standard not only shows
respect for the states' traditional role in the area of education but also places a proper
amount of responsibility on the parents of handicapped children.
184. Rowley, 485 U.S. at 186.
185. In the leading case of Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), the
court struck down a Pennsylvania state education policy that limited the time of instruction
per year for all children, including handicapped children, to 180 days. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the EAHCA's IEP requirement is sugges-
tive of the emphasis that the Act places on the individual child. Id. at 280. Consequently,
the court believed that Pennsylvania's inflexible policy of refusing to provide more than 180
days of education was incompatable with the Act's emphasis on the needs of an individual
child. Id. Two judges wrote separate opinions. One judge determined that the maximization
of individual potential was the objective of the EAHCA and, therefore, limited finances
could not be used as an excuse for failure to achieve this objective. Id. at 285-86 (Sloviter,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). A concurring opinion, however, concluded that
school districts may eliminate some educational programs as long as they did so because of
"legitimate funding limitations." Id. at 283 (Van Duesn, J., concurring).
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preme Court scrutinized the precise words of the EAHCA and its
legislative history and refused to distort the plain import of Con-
gress's language.186 Some educators have construed the Court's rul-
ing that a hearing-impaired student was not entitled to the ser-
vices of a sign language interpreter as relieving the problems of
financially burdened schools.18 7 Rowley, however, furnished suffi-
cient leeway for different types of handicaps and may have actu-
ally expanded the scope of the right to education for handicapped
children as conferred by prior decisions.
The Rowley decision involved the particular kinds of services
that were needed in order to provide a particular student with an
appropriate education. Justice Rehnquist carefully limited his
analysis to the unique facts of the case and stated: "Because in this
case we are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving
substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is
performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public
school system, we confine our analysis to that situation." 88 The
Court specifically stated that it was not establishing any one test
for determining the adequacy of educational benefits.8 9 Hence, the
Court provided sufficient flexibility for future situations involving
186. 458 U.S. at 190 n.11 (quoting 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. at 592.).
On a general level, the Rowley decision demonstrates the Court's absolute conviction to
determine legislative intent through investigation of the language and legislative history of a
particular statute. In doing so the Court embarks on, a wild goose chase. Congress did not
attempt to define the word "appropriate" in the EAHCA and left to the judiciary the task
of formulating a definition of this term on a case-by-case basis. The Court might have for-
mulated such a definition had its membership not changed after Congress passed the
EAHCA. Unlike the Warren Court in existence at the time of the EAHCA's enactment, the
Burger Court is conservatively disposed. Hence, it is not surprising that the Rowley Court
refused to impose its view of policy upon the states. 458 U.S. at 190 n.11, 207. The Burger
Court is very concerned that the judiciary stay within its limits so as not to strengthen its
position vis-a-vis the other branches of government. See generally Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (judi-
ciary cannot hear cases that are generalized grievances as a matter within the scope of arti-
cle III of the Constitution); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (dismissing a complaint
brought by members of Congress alleging that the President had exceeded his constitutional
powers by terminating a treaty without the consent of Congress where Congress had not
taken official action against the President); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (courts
should only decide legal claims of a specific person with a specific injury caused by the
actions of a specific government action). Thus, if Congress wants a statutory provision to be
interpreted in a particular manner, Congress will have to express its intent unambiguously.
Passing references, the Rowley Court made clear, will not be considered controlling. See
supra note 141 and accompanying text.
187. Butler & Cook, After Rowley: An Effective Education for Handicapped Children,
TRAL, Sept. 1982, at 71.
188. 458 U.S. at 202.
189. Id.
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different handicapping conditions. Furthermore, despite frequent
references in the EAHCA's legislative history to the desirability of
promoting self-sufficiency among the handicapped,19 the Court
felt that the self-sufficiency goal was inadequate protection for the
mildly handicapped."9" Although a grade advancement seemed to
be dispositive in Rowley, the Court recognized that not every
handicapped child who advances from grade to grade could be
deemed to have received a "free appropriate public education." e
Prior decisions emphasized that a child may not be denied access
to a publicly supported education; passing from one grade to an-
other would definitely be evidence that this requirement had been
fulfilled. The decision in Rowley, therefore, may have enlarged the
rights of handicapped children.
The Rowley decision also confirmed the mainstreaming re-
quirement of the EAHCA. The Court stated that "'the Act requires
participating states to educate handicapped children with non-
handicapped children wherever possible."'9 3 Because Rowley would
never have arisen if the EAHCA had no mainstreaming require-
ment, the Supreme Court's belief that mainstreaming is beneficial
is quite apparent. Unfortunately, despite the favorable impact of
Rowley on the right of a handicapped child to an education, this
right remains somewhat illusory under the EAHCA.
The Supreme Court in Rowley confirmed Congress's recogni-
tion of the primacy of the states in the area of education. 94 Rowley
determined that the states have the primary responsibility for de-
termining educational programs and that it is highly unlikely that
Congress intended reviewing courts to overturn a state's educa-
tional theory. As a result, the Court fashioned a standard of judi-
cial review for cases arising under the EAHCA that is very limited
in scope. The basic inquiry under the Court's standard is whether
an IEP' 95 is reasonably calculated to enable a handicapped child to
receive educational benefits. Furthermore, the Rowley Court
showed a great degree of deference to states' administrative pro-
ceedings.'" As a result of Rowley, a state's school officials now
190. See S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1433; see also 121 CONG. REc. 37,416 (1975).
191. 458 U.S. at 201 n.23.
192. Id. at 203 n.25.
193. Id. at 202 (footnote omitted).
194. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 182.
196. "The fact that Section 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court 'receive the
records of the [state] administrative proceedings' carries with it the implied requirement
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know that a court is not likely to find their educational theory in-
consistent with the requirements of the EAHCA.
This minimum standard, that the particular educational pro-
gram selected be only reasonably likely to confer benefits upon a
handicapped child, might encourage some school officials to be-
come lax on the quality of education that they provide. The rea-
sonableness factor considered by the Court in formulating the
scope of judicial review under the EAHCA might encourage states
to consider budgeting a priority in formulating a program for a
handicapped child. It should be noted, however, that the Rowley
Court never mentioned that cost is a valid reason for a state's fail-
ure to provide a handicapped child with an appropriate education.
On the contrary, the Court stated that Congress intended for edu-
cation to be beneficial, regardless of the cost.197 However, states are
not required to expend all available federal funds toward educa-
tion for the handicapped. The omission of a requirement that
states must expend all available funds toward the education of the
handicapped, and the Court's holding that the states do not have
to provide opportunities commensurate with those given nonhandi-
capped children, impose a lesser burden upon the states than the
lower court's interpretation would have imposed. Given this lee-
way, local school administrators will realize that funds allocated
towards special education may be cut from other areas of the
school budget. Thus, they will "focus on what is available within
the school system rather than on what [educational program] is
most appropriate for an individual child." ' e
Other factors will influence local school officials' choice of
what educational programs to fund. Because only a small percent-
age of public school teachers have training in special education,19'
officials are likely to choose inferior educational programs that re-
quire little expertise among teachers at the expense of the quality
of a handicapped child's education. Furthermore, school adminis-
that due weight shall be given these proceedings." 458 U.S. at 206. Therefore, while future
reviewing courts will probably still allow new evidence to be presented, the courts will
demonstrate greater respect for the decisions of hearing officers. See Laura M. v. Special
School Dist. No. 1, [1980-81 Decisions] EDuc. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 552:152 (D.
Minn. Jan. 21, 1980).
197. 458 U.S. at 201 n.23. Cost considerations for the most severely handicapped are
often misplaced. Congress has recognized that children with severe handicaps are by far the
fewest in number. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1975).
198. Note, supra note 16, at 1109-10.
199. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EDUCATION PROFESSIONS DEVELOPMENT, MAIN-
STREAMING: HELPING TEACHERS MEET THE CHALLENGE 18 (1976).
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trators will probably choose programs that require the least admin-
istrative workload.20
0
The Rowley Court's emphasis on parental protection suggests
that the Court recognized that as a result of its decision, states
might attempt to limit the quality of public education available to
the handicapped.2 0 1 The Court assumed that parents would be
zealous in promoting the rights of their handicapped children. The
Court's assumption, however, may be erroneous in that many par-
ents are simply not heard. Some parents, for example, blindly sub-
mit to the opinions of professional educators either because they
are ignorant of alternative educational approaches or because they
simply trust the "expert. 202 Lack of time and resources, especially
among poorer parents, further hampers parental efforts to check
the discretion of local administrators. Finally, some parents just do
not understand their rights under the EAHCA.20
B. Political Implications of Rowley
In enacting the EAHCA, Congress believed that properly edu-
cating handicapped children and thereby enabling them to become
productive citizens, would be less costly than allowing them to re-
main societal burdens.204 A lifetime of institutionalized care, for
example, may cost as much as 400 thousand dollars per person. 0 6
Furthermore, the burden of caring for an uneducated handicapped
child significantly disrupts the lives of his or her family mem-
bers. 2 6 These views, however, conflict with the budgetary realities
of government. Special education costs have been rising at double
the rate of regular education costs.2 07 The EAHCA only supplies
200. Administrators may attempt to standardize administrative functions. See Kirp,
Buss & Kuriloff, supra note 61, at 47. Administrators may also attempt to convince parents
that they are providing their children with appropriate services. See R. WEATHERLY & M.
LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION 60-62 (1977).
201. 458 U.S. at 208-09.
202. See R. WEATHERLY & M. LIPSKY, supra note 199, at 51.
203. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). To allevi-
ate cost problems, Congress may authorize an award of attorney fees. An additional alterna-
tive would be to bar schools from having attorneys present in administrative hearings when
parents are not represented by counsel. See Note, supra note 16, at 1112.
204. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1425, 1433.
205. R. CONLEY, THE ECONOMICS OF MENTAL RETARDATION 322 (1973). Because the
EAHCA requires mainstreaming, an increase in the enrollment of handicapped children
does not result in a corresponding increase in costs. See National Public Radio & Institute
for Educational Leadership, Optims in Education Program No. 36, July 5, 1976, at 11.
206. H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975).
207. Rauth, What Can Be Expected of the Regular Education Teacher? Ideals and
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part of the cost of educating a handicapped child; some states and
localities simply cannot be expected to provide the difference. For
example, in New York City, while the number of special education
students rose dramatically, a financial emergency forced the city to
cut its entire educational spending budget.2 08 One commentator
has suggested that under the EAHCA, schools will resemble
mental health clinics and that the states will not be able to bear
the costs.2 0e Congressmen have stated that the bill represented the
"ultimate in irresponsibility, '210 and President Ford felt that the
funds authorized were both excessive and unrealistic. 1"
In addition to their fiscal limitations, public educational facili-
ties across the nation are already being severely criticized for fail-
ing to meet fundamental educational goals. With widespread func-
tional illiteracy and declining SAT scores," 2 it is difficult to justify
spending colossal amounts of funds on the problems-perhaps ir-
remediable-of the seriously handicapped. Parents of nonhandi-
capped children, concerned with the decline in the quality of pub-
lic education, feel that funds expended on special education for the
handicapped should be spent to better educate their own
children. 1
The Reagan Administration, as part of its policy of deregula-
Realities, 2 EXCErloMN. EDUC. Q., Aug. 1981, at 31.
208. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1976, § 12, at 1, col. 1.
209. Smith, Chapter 766: A Problem in Implementation, B.U.J. EDuc., Feb. 1975, at 9.
210. 121 CONG. REC. 25,534 (1975) (remarks of Representative Ashbrook).
211. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1975, at 31, col. 1.
212. Why Public Schools Fail, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 1981, at 62. Studies have found
academic regression among students in public schools. "The 1964 Haryou Report showed
actual academic regression in New York City's Harlem where 'twenty-two percent of the
third grade students in that area were reading above grade level, while thirty percent were
reading below grade level .... By the sixth grade twelve percent were reading above grade
level, and eighty-one percent were reading below grade level."' Gard, San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez: On Our Way to Where?, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 1, 5 (1973)
(citing NEW YORK: HARLEM YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES UNLIMITED, INC., YouTH IN THE GHrro
168-70 (1964)); see also, R. HURLEY, POVERTY AND MENTAL RETARDATION: A CAUSAL RELA-
TIONSHiP 262 (1969); B. BLOOM, A. DAVIS & R. HESS, COMPENSATORY EDUCATION FOR CUL-
TURAL DEPRIVATION 74 (1965).
Former students have brought actions against their schools alleging negligence and edu-
cational malpractice. The students have argued that their former schools are liable because
they have deprived the student of basic academic skills. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco
United School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976); Garret v. School Bd.,
No. 77-8703 (Fla. Dade County Ct. Dec. 5, 1977); Donohue v. Copaigue Free School Dist., 95
Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977), afl'd, 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978);
see also Note, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FoRnHAM Uan. L.J. 117
(1978).
213. See Large, supra note 21, at 242.
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tion,214 has taken action on programs involving rights of the handi-
capped. In 1981, the Administration ordered the Office of Special
Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) to review the pro-
visions of the EAHCA.2 15 OSERS was directed to accomplish four
goals: 1) minimize unnecessary regulations in special education; 2)
reduce unnecessary paperwork burdens on states and localities; 3)
relieve fiscal pressures by applying a cost-benefit analysis of the
substantive provisions of the EAHCA; and 4) protect the rights of
the handicapped by affording them an equal educational opportu-
nity.21 The Reagan Administration also ordered OSERS to con-
sider more restrictive definitions of a "free appropriate public edu-
cation.121 7 The Supreme Court in Rowley was probably aware of
the fiscal limitations of the states, and of the Reagan Administra-
tion's deregulatory activity, when it decided not to provide an
overexpansive interpretation of the "free appropriate public educa-
tion" requirement.
The proposed regulations"1 ' issued by Secretary of Education
Terrence H. Bell in response to the Rowley decision evidence the
controversial nature of the debate over a handicapped child's right
to an education. These regulations have been regarded as a "major
Reagan Administration deregulatory initiative."2 The regulations
were intended to ease the fiscal and administrative burdens on the
214. See, e.g., Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
215. Council for Exceptional Children, 12 UPDATE No. 4, at 8 (1982).
216. EHLR Special Report: OSE Regulation Review, [1980-81 Decisions] EDuc. HANDI-
CAPPED L. REP. (CRR) AC190 (Oct. 2, 1981). OSERS identified sixteen provisions that would
be subject to review. Id. at 189. Listed for review are: 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.5, .540-43 (1983)
(defining handicapped children and dealing with specific learning disabilities); id. §§ 300.13-
.14 (1983) (defining special education and related services); id. §§ 300.121-.284 (dealing with
state plans and local educational agency applications); id. §§ 300.650-.653 (dealing with
state advisory panels); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.750-.754 (dealing with reports state agencies must
file); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1, .4, .300-.307 (dealing with free appropriate public education); id. §§
300.4, .300 (dealing with an extended school year program); id. §§ 300.300, .4, .513 (dealing
with suspension and expulsion); id. §§ 300.302, .401 (dealing with the out-of-state placement
of handicapped children); id. §§ 300.340-.349 (dealing with individualized education pro-
gram); id. §§ 300.451-.452, 76.651-.655 (dealing with services provided children in private
schools); id. §§ 300.380-.387 (dealing with comprehensive system of personnel development);
id. §§ 300.506-.513 (dealing with due process procedures); id. §§ 300.350(b), .532 (dealing
with nondiscrimination in evaluation procedures); id. §§ 300.550-.556 (dealing with the least
restrictive environment requirement); id. §§ 300.560, .576 (dealing with confidentiality of
information). EHLR Special Report: OSE Regulation Review, [1980-81 Decisions EDuc.
HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) AC189 (Oct. 2, 1981).
217. EHLR Special Report, OSE Regulation Review, [1980-81 Decisions] EDUc. HANDI-
CAPPED L. REP. (CRR) at AC189 (Oct. 2, 1981).
218. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,836 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
219. Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1982, at 20, col. 3.
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local school systems, without jeopardizing the rights of handi-
capped youngsters.2 0 The public, by submitting comments that
the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief requested, aided
the Department of Regulation in identifying regulations that were
unnecessary or unduly burdensome.22' Immediate protests met the
proposed regulations. Opponents argued that while some school
districts might continue to provide quality education, others might
take advantage of the deregulatory nature of the regulations. 2
Parents of 4.2 million handicapped youths criticized the plan as a
threat to their children.223 Congress especially disapproved of the
proposed regulations2 4 and as a result, adopted a resolution disap-
proving of the entire set of proposed regulations before recessing.
By adopting the resolution, Congress wanted to ensure that the
Reagan Administration would not attempt to promulgate any new
regulations during the Congressional recess. 25
It is, therefore, apparent that the rights of the handicapped to
a special education are caught in the middle of a political struggle
between the executive and the legislative branches. Furthermore,
Rowley was decided in the midst of one of our nation's worst reces-
sions. The Supreme Court, undoubtedly aware of these circum-
stances, was reluctant to take the liberal step of providing handi-
capped children with an educational opportunity commensurate
with that of nonhandicapped children. Instead, the Court returned
a substantial amount of the responsibility for educating the handi-
capped to the states.""'
220. 47 Fed. Reg. at 33,836 (1982) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
221. Id. Some of the proposed regulations would have eviscerated the EAHCA. One
provision would have reduced the obligation of schools to provide health related services.
Another would have weakened the role of parents in the IEP process. A final provision
would have allowed schools to remove disruptive children from regular classrooms. Id.
222. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at A26, col. 1.
223. Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1982, at 20, col. 3.
224. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 5. The disapproval really "'sends a
message [on] what the will of Congress is on this issue."' Id. (remarks of Representative
Erdahl). "'Yes, this will clearly be a message to the White House.'" Id. (remarks of Repre-
sentative Biaggi).
225. Id.
226. It has been suggested that in times of limited resources, a nationalized decision-
making framework is disadvantageous because policy statements are highly visible. It would
be extremely embarassing for the national government to restrict the objectives of the
EAHCA. Furthermore, such policies are more susceptible to attack by special advocacy
groups. Thus, a return of responsibility to the states is in the nature of a "subterfuge."
Decisions made on the state level are more difficult to challenge. See G. CALABRESli & P.
BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 53-54, 73 (1978).
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IV. CONCLUSION
According to the United States Supreme Court in Board of
Education v. Rowley, the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act does not confer upon handicapped children the right to receive
an education equal in quality to the education available to non-
handicapped children. The Court, faced with the challenge of in-
terpreting the Act for the first time, displayed its conservative na-
ture and refused to substitute its own ideals and values for those of
the legislature and the administrative boards by narrowly defining
the Act's provision of a "free appropriate public education." At the
same time, the Court's holding that an appropriate education does
not require commensurate opportunities was consistent with the
holdings of pre-EAHCA decisions. Furthermore, the Rowley
Court's decision reaffirmed the states' traditional role in the area
of education.
The seeming callousness of the Court's decision is mitigated
upon delving into the Court's reasoning and taking into account
the political climate existing at the time of the decision. The judi-
ciary reflects contemporary social factors and values. In balancing
the realities of the economic depression our country was experienc-
ing when the Court decided Rowley, with the peculiar facts of
Rowley, the Court had no choice but to deny Amy a sign language
interpreter. However, realizing the facial harshness of its decision,
the Court struggled to provide some flexibility. As a result, the
Court emphasized the diligence local school administrators had
displayed when confronted with Amy's education. Should future
cases involve blatant failure on the part of the states to provide for
the education of the handicapped, or should the economy return to
a healthy condition, the Supreme Court might favor interpreting
the EAHCA to provide handicapped children with an educational
opportunity that is more substantial than the one they now
receive.
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